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EDITORIAL
Hate and counter-voices in the Internet: Introduction to the special 
issue
Deutscher Titel: Hass und Gegenstimmen im Internet: Einleitung in 
das Sonderheft
Diana Rieger, Josephine B. Schmitt & Lena Frischlich
Abstract: The Internet creates a space in which hate, negativity and the derogation of cer-
tain individuals or social groups (e.g., homosexuals, migrants, or women) can be found in 
various facets—be it in hateful comments of single users under journalistic online articles 
or below YouTube videos, propagandistic messages of extremists, or populist speech of 
political parties. At the same time, the Internet can also empower voices against online 
hate. The articles in this special issue focus on this spectrum, providing new insights into 
hate and counter-voices in online media. 
Following the ARD/ZDF online study, more than 90 percent of Germans are on-
line, more than half of them use the Internet daily (Frees & Koch, 2018). Besides 
all benefits, online media also offer a space in which online hate (i.e., cyber hate, 
hate speech, and extremism) flourishes. We conceptualize online hate as norm-
transgressing communication that is (1) characterized by the derogation and defa-
mation of single individuals (offensive speech) as well as members of targeted 
social groups (hate speech), (2) spread by individual users, social bots, as well as 
social groups or state actors (Marwick & Lewis, 2017), (3) motivated by person-
al, social, as well as ideological factors (Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012).
In consequence of a recent German law, the Network Enforcement Act 
(NetzDG, 2017), social media platforms were urged to implement procedures 
that allow users to report illegal content, often consisting of hate speech or even 
extremist content. Moreover, the platforms are obliged to canvass these user re-
ports immediately and to delete hateful content if applicable. From January to 
July 2018, users of social media platforms (in this case: Twitter, Facebook and 
Google) flagged more than 500,000 posts as being inappropriate (Gollatz, Riedl, 
& Pohlmann, 2018). Most plausible, the number of unreported cases is far higher. 
While probably not all of the flagged posts are hateful, populist or extremist in 
nature, the numbers elucidate that the posting and subsequent removal of online 
hate is not a rare phenomenon. 
Taking these numbers into account, it seems plausible that online negativity, 
hate, disinformation and propaganda can contribute to the radicalization of indi-
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viduals, the polarization of societies, or to a radicalization of public discourse. 
Although the mere contact to online hate does not trigger radicalization, scientific 
consensus suggests that online media can serve as a catalyst in complex radicali-
zation or polarization processes (Hohnstein & Glaser, 2017; Meleagrou-Hitchens 
& Kaderbhai, 2017). In consequence, a better understanding of the nature, pro-
cesses and effects of hate as “dark side” of online-communication and empirical 
insights into successful ways to counter it, is highly needed. 
The articles in this special issue provide such insights into current research ad-
dressing the “dark side” of online communication. At the same time, they go be-
yond focusing on potentially problematic communication by also addressing em-
pirical insights or drawing conclusions for communicative counter-strategies. In 
the following, we will detail some of the articles’ main contributions to the field 
while providing a very short overview about the phenomenon of online hate and 
communicative counter-strategies. Finally, we will highlight some directions for 
future research in this area. 
1. The special issue
1.1 Frequency and nature of online hate
Although notions about online media failing to adhere to general norms of 
 politeness (Papacharissi, 2004) due to noxious communication such as trolling 
(Buckels, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014) or flaming (O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003) are 
nothing new, the risk of exposure to uncivil online discourses (Coe, Kenski, & 
Rains, 2014; Muddiman, 2017) seems to be increasing (Kaakinen, Oksanen, & 
Räsänen, 2018). In Germany, the Joint Competence Center for the Protection of 
Minors on the Internet, Jugendschutz.net, reported that the number of violations 
against the youth protection law (JuSchG, 2002) increased from around 6,000 
registered violations in 2015 (Schindler, Glaser, Herzog, & Özkilic, 2015) to more 
than 7,000 in 2016 (Schindler, Glaser, Herzog, & Özkilic, 2016). The share of vio-
lations due to extremist content more than doubled during that time (ibid., p. 27). 
It is thus not surprising that the recent report by the Online Civil Courage Ini-
taitve (OCII, Baldauf et al., 2018) argues that online hate can contribute to soci-
etal polarization and extremist radicalization. More than half (67%) of Germans 
older than 14 years report experiences with “hate comments,” and about half of 
the adolescents in Germany recall pre-experience with extremist online propa-
ganda (Reinemann, Ninierza, Fawzi, Riesmeyer, & Neumann, 2019). Notably, 
these numbers mainly refer to witnessing such content. At the same time, when 
asked about extremist online content, in particular adolescents and young adults 
report uneasy feelings and low certainty in how extremist messages can be de-
tected.
This finding elucidates that one central difficulty in dealing with online hate is 
the often-veiled nature of online hate. This can be explained by extremists’ at-
tempt to cover their messages in a youth-oriented fashion, following a “wolf-in-
sheep-clothes”-strategy (Reinemann et al., 2019; Rieger et al., 2013; Schmitt, 
Ernst, Frischlich, & Rieger, 2017). 
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The study by Schwarzenegger and Wagner in this issue demonstrates how ex-
treme right actors in four Western democracies strategically abuse satire and hu-
mor to disseminate online hate into the mainstream discourse. They further shed 
light on how users interact with such content. The particularly skilled actors be-
hind online hate are only one reason why an estimation of the overall frequency 
of online hate is hard to obtain and also make first contacts with online hate low-
threshold.
Although the pre-experience with online hate among Finnish Facebook users is 
as high as in Germany (67%), only 21% of them were attacked personally 
 (Oksanen, Hawdon, Holkeri, Näsi, & Räsänen, 2014). For highly targeted groups 
such as members of stigmatized groups (Dieckmann, Geschke, & Braune, 2018), 
politicians, activists or journalists, these numbers can be substantially higher. For 
instance, Preuß, Tetzlaff, and Zick (2017) found that 42% of German journalists 
had been personally attacked during 2016. 
The study by Obermaier, Hofbauer, and Reinemann puts this numbers into 
context by showing that the clear majority of journalists in Germany (over 70%) 
is almost never attacked personally but rather observes attacks on colleagues. The 
study, however, also demonstrates that being targeted by hate speech can over-
shadow journalists’ relationships with their audiences: Journalists who were fre-
quently attacked responded pugnaciously with increased skepticism regarding 
their audience, more anger and a higher confirmation in their work. 
Noteworthy for journalists as well as victims of discrimination, attacks were 
observed more often offline than online (Dieckmann et al., 2018; Preuß et al., 
2017), underlining that hate is not a phenomenon of online media alone but that 
those spreading hate, calls for violence and extremist propaganda do use online 
media, too. As terrorism researcher Peter Neumann summarized it recently: “If 
22-years-old foreign fighters in Syria post selfies and publish them in social media 
they do not only act as extremists but mainly like 99 percent of their contempo-
raries” (Baldauf, Ebner, & Guhl, 2018, p. 5).
Additionally, relative to overall online content, the share of hateful content in 
online media is rather small. A large project examining the entire Facebook com-
munication of the Ethiopian diaspora community, a religiously and politically 
deeply polarized society, found only a small minority of all comments (less than 
1%) being hate speech. Similarly, our study on the pre-moderated comments 
posted in Germany’s largest newspaper discussion forum, Spiegel online, shows 
that only a small share (less than 10%) of user comments entailed direct indica-
tors of hate such as racial slurs or swear words (Boberg, Schatto-Eckrott, 
Frischlich, & Quandt, 2018). These findings are also supported by a study analyz-
ing hate speech in user comments on YouTube (Ernst et al., 2017). However, even 
if the amount of hate comments—in relation to the absolute sum of comments—
is relatively low, they can have strong effects on people who see them or those 
who are potentially targeted by them. 
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1.2 Effects of online hate 
There are various studies pointing at potential effects of user comments on per-
ception of the related online content (e.g., Kim, 2015; Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 
2010; Sikorski & Hänelt, 2016; Weber, 2014). For instance, the valence of com-
ments affects the perceived journalistic quality, the trustworthiness, and persua-
siveness of online news articles (Sikorski & Hänelt, 2016). Lee and Jang (2010) 
demonstrated that people who read comments opposed to news content change 
their attitudes concerning the news compared to people who read the news article 
without comments or comments supporting the article’s opinion.
Further, online hate has been found to trigger sequences comparable to those 
caused by other traumatic experiences among members of stigmatized groups 
(Leets, 2002), diminish social trust among witnesses (Näsi, Räsänen,  Hawdon, 
Holkeri, & Oksanen, 2015), and foster prejudice and aggression amongst those 
belonging to the perpetrators’ social category (Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, & Malinen, 
2015; Rösner, Winter, & Krämer, 2016; Soral, Bilewicz, & Winiewski, 2017). 
Attempts to repress online hate, such as the German Network Enforcement 
Law (NetzDG, 2017), have gained substantial critique as potentially diminishing 
rights of free speech and risking to fuel radicalization itself (George, 2016). In ad-
dition, the questions “when does hate begin” and, consequently, “what should be 
deleted” are difficult to answer. The evaluation of noxious online material can 
vary substantially between coders (Ross et al., 2016), depending on whether the 
perspective of the sender, the receiver, or an observer is weighted most (O’Sullivan 
& Flanagin, 2003). It is therefore not surprising that many actors call for alterna-
tive strategies to fight online hate such as the promotion of counter-voices.
1.3 Counter-voices 
Counter-voices herein are conceptualized as the large spectrum of communicative 
responses to online hate. Counter-voices can disseminate messages of tolerance 
and civility, contributing to civic education in a broader sense. In educational sci-
ence or clinical context, such messages usually are considered as one primary 
prevention strategy. Counter-voices can also be directed to specific groups or con-
texts that have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to noxious effects 
of online hate or that already show an affinity to online hate groups (secondary 
prevention). Finally, counter-voices can respond directly to those spreading hate 
(tertiary prevention). In each of these contexts, other senders (e.g., moderators, 
other users etc.) can raise their voice against online hate and uncivil communica-
tion as the papers in this special issue show. 
Addressing the central role of journalistic moderators, Ziegele, Jost, Bohrmann 
and Reinbach show how journalists’ own response to online hate can affect sub-
sequent discourses in their comment sections. Their paper makes a strong argu-
ment for sociable counter-voices as fruitful and effective strategy against online 
hate while simultaneously underlying the noxious effects of repressive, authori-
tarian responses. 
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Counter-voices are not restricted to moderators or the proprietors of online 
spaces. Users themselves are a crucial part of most platforms’ strategies to fight 
online hate (for a media report, see Hensel, 2018), yet, the boundary conditions 
under which users take action against noxious online communication have gained 
scarce attention so far. 
The study by Leonhard, Rueß, Obermaier, and Reinemann fills in this void by 
examining how characteristics of the communication environment, namely the 
number of other users or “bystanders,” of the hate communication itself, and of 
the individual users, namely their evaluation of the situation and feeling of re-
sponsibility, interact in predicting their intentions to raise their voice against on-
line hate. 
Noteworthy, raising one’s voice alone is not necessarily enough to counter on-
line hate effectively. The simulation model by Schieb and Preuss shows that in 
different communities, different forms of counter-speech are most promising: 
While in rather neutral contexts, online hate is combated most effectively with 
harsh rejection, in polarized, hateful environments moderate voices are more ef-
fectively in changing the overall tone. 
Overall, the study by Ziegele et al., and the work by Schieb and Preuss under-
line prior research’s notion about potentially unwanted side effects of counter-
voices (Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011)—particularly when counter-voices do 
not hold up to civic, participatory standards themselves but act in an authorita-
tive manner or mock about those falling for extremist ideologies (compatible to 
our own findings, Frischlich, Rieger, Morten, & Bente, 2017).
2. Directions for future research
Although the articles in this special issue contribute to our understanding of on-
line hate and counter voices, they can present only a part of the picture. We will 
describe some other aspects of online hate and counter-voices in the following 
aiming to provide starting points for future research beyond the valuable ques-
tions raised within the single papers. 
2.1 Who spreads online hate?
Overall, little attention is paid to the role of individual dispositions for the volun-
tarily reception or conscious distribution of online hate. As such, the question of 
“who spreads online hate” is surely a fruitful venue for future research. The im-
balance of studying “who raises their voice against hate” versus “who spreads 
hate” might be partially due to larger empirical challenges in approaching those 
spreading online hate. Besides human agents, algorithms and algorithm-based 
agents (i.e., social bots) can also play a role in the spreading of online hate 
(Frischlich, Boberg, & Quandt, 2017). Further, algorithms also determine or 
guide selective exposure to certain contents in online media. Through topical 
linkage (e.g., reliance on keywords), for example in the case of recommendation 
algorithms, counter-voices and online hate can be linked in undesired manners 
(Schmitt, Rieger, Rutkowski, & Ernst, 2018). Initial studies show that including 
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an actor-centered perspective is crucial for understanding the multiple motives 
(personal, ideological, economical) underlying the spread of online hate (Buckels 
et al., 2014; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Jablonska & Kozak, 2017;  Marwick & 
Lewis, 2017).
2.2 In which channel? 
A substantial part of communication research on online hate and counter-voices 
focuses on large platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, or the comment 
sections of journalistic online media. This focus is—to some extent—justified by 
the reach and hence potential impact of these channels. However, particularly 
strategic online hate (e.g., by right-wing hate groups) often emerges from more 
fringe communities or networks such as gap, 4chan, or reddit (Zannettou et al., 
2018), respectively is created in specific threads on these communities or in closed 
groups on larger platforms (Morin & Flynn, 2014; Musgrave, 2017). Even more 
difficult to study: Online hate and extremism are increasingly spread via end-to-
end encrypted instant messengers such as telegram or WhatsApp (Bloom, Tiflati, 
& Horgan, 2017; Yayla & Speckhard, 2017). Although studying such counter-
public or semi-private spheres poses unique challenges for researchers, ranging 
from theoretically sound sampling over ethical questions up to personal risks 
when entering these contexts, more systematical research in this area is necessary 
to understand how online hate is born and breed before entering mainstream on-
line spaces. 
In a related vein, online hate might substantially benefit from “approval” by 
established authorities such as politicians or journalistic media (see e.g. Neumann 
& Baugut, 2016 on reciprocal media effects on extremists). Increasing numbers 
of hate crimes in the US (Levin & Grisham, 2017) as well as the UK (Corcoran & 
Smith, 2016) seem to underline the noxious potential of hateful governments on 
intergroup relations. Studying the effects of online hate by governmental actors 
beyond considering it as part of the populist communication logic (Engesser, 
 Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017; Fawzi et al., 2017), thus seems to be a fruitful venue for 
further research.
2.3 Towards which audience?
The aforementioned success by right-wing populists and their often harsh and 
hateful rhetoric might partially explain why such forms of hate gained the lion’s 
share of attention over the course of the last months (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; 
Marwick, Blackwell, & Lo, 2016). It is further complemented by an ongoing focus 
on extremism proclaimed to be inspired by Islam (Chatfield, Reddick, & 
 Brajawidagda, 2015; Farkas, Schou, & Neumayer, 2018; Winter, 2018). However, 
online hate and extremism are not bound to certain ends of the political spectrum 
or certain religions as the spread of hate by for instance nationalist Buddhist 
monks against the Rohingya has again shown (Gowen & Bearak, 2017). 
Previous studies additionally argue that for extreme communication (e.g., pop-
ulist communication, online hate, extremist messages) to have an effect, the audi-
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ence’ context plays an important role: Uncertainty or the feeling being threatened 
can increase the vulnerability (Frischlich, Rieger, Hein, & Bente, 2015; Rieger, 
Frischlich, & Bente, 2017). Extending research into these areas would help to 
understand the general mechanisms underlying online hate as communicative 
phenomenon beyond current use cases. 
This becomes even more important when considering the network structure of 
the internet in which algorithms also decide what users find and stumble upon 
(Schmitt et al., 2018). Even attempts to fight hate online, for example through the 
production and distribution of counter-voices can evoke new online hate (Ernst et 
al., 2017). Studies on the effects of online hate predominantly address the per-
spective of majority members although hate speech is most often directed to spe-
cific minority groups. The effects of hate speech or extremist propaganda, for in-
stance, on members of religious minorities are more seldom. Including their 
perspectives, however, is crucial to evaluate the impact of online hate and coun-
ter-voices as research with minority members convincingly demonstrates (Appel, 
2012;  Harrell, Hall, & Taliaferro, 2003; Morten, Frischlich, Rieger, & Bente, 
2017; Neumann, Arendt, & Baugut, 2017; Rieger, Frischlich, & Bente, 2013).
3. Conclusion
This overview aimed at framing the topic of this special issue and the content 
presented in the distinct contributions. While the papers in this special add to the 
empirical evidence in the field of hate and counter-voices in the internet, they also 
stimulate new perspectives on hate speech, radicalization and prevention strate-
gies in online media. 
On a more abstract level, the contributions in this special issue also show the 
methodological diversity of approaches in communication science to detect, ana-
lyze or test the effect of online hate and prevention. They address the phenome-
non of online hate and (communicative) counter means with qualitative 
(Schwarzenegger & Wagner) and quantitative content analyses (Ziegele, Jost, 
Bohrmann, & Reinbach), a survey (Obermaier, Hofbauer & Reinemann), experi-
ments (Leonhard, Rueß, Obermaier & Reinemann) as well as a computational 
simulation (Schieb & Preuss), making a strong argument for the value of diverse 
perspectives in understanding current communication phenomena. We hope that 
this special issue will contribute to scholarly as well as application-oriented dis-
cussions regarding what is arguably one of the mostly debated aspects of online 
communication. 
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